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Distinguished Address
The Near-Term Outlook 
for Fiscal Policy
hen I accepted the invitation several months ago to 
speak on the near-term fiscal outlook, I was not nearly 
as confused by it as I am today. But since that time, I have been 
confused, first by the implications of the methods used to enact 
appropriations this year and what these methods suggest about 
the sustainability of the budget rules that have served us well 
since 1990. It is not clear what will replace these rules and how 
future spending and tax policy will be affected. Second—and 
most important—I am confused by the economy and the stock 
market, which continue to defy, in a good way, most of what I 
thought I knew about macroeconomics and financial markets. 
If the good economic and financial news continues, my other 
confusions are unimportant and there is very little to worry 
about. 
Let me expand a bit on my confusions and run the risk of 
leaving you as confused as I am. But before I look at the 
problems created by this year’s deliberations, it is important to 
point out that the current fiscal situation is astonishingly good. 
The baseline unified budget surplus is large and growing, and 
both political parties promise to save a large portion of it. 
I would say that absent a significant recession, surpluses are 
almost certain to last for several years. Even a significant 
recession is unlikely to cause deficits large enough to break the 
downward trend in the debt-to-GDP ratio. In summary, it 
is the best fiscal situation since the 1920s. Sometimes that 
statement makes audiences nervous, but the 1920s were a good 
decade if we forget about that pesky last year. What all this 
means for the supply of public debt is difficult to estimate with 
confidence, but I shall give it a shot at the end of this talk.
Turning to the bad news, it appeared at the beginning of 
1999 that the caps on discretionary spending for 2000 agreed 
to in 1997 would require a real cut of 5 to 6 percent compared 
with 1999 levels. Everyone knew that such a large cut was 
unrealistic and that the rational course would have been to 
renegotiate the caps to a level that was fiscally prudent but 
doable. In my view, that would mean caps that allowed a real 
increase in spending, but an increase that was less than GDP 
growth. However, many House members firmly believed that 
having very low caps would restrain spending more than  
would be the case if the caps were relaxed. 
Ironically, I believe that this created a dynamic in which 
spending grew faster than it would have if there were no caps 
at all, because of efforts to boost spending early in the process. 
In the end, the Congress resorted to mechanisms to make it 
seem as though the caps were adhered to and as though the 
unified budget surplus would at least equal the surplus in the 
Social Security trust fund. 
The use of such mechanisms is nothing new, but this year 
their importance reached an extraordinary level. To lower 2000 
estimated spending, outlays were pulled forward into 1999 and 
delayed to 2001, while receipts were moved forward from 2001 
to 2000. In addition, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
was directed to use the lower outlay estimates of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to the tune of $23 billion, and 
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liberal use was made of emergency provisions that exempt 
spending from the caps. The most extreme was declaring the 
2000 census an emergency, even though we have known that 
we would have to have one since 1789. Emergency outlays will 
total $19 billion in 2000, but the emergencies provided for in 
2000 will continue to affect outlays in 2001. 
Correcting for timing adjustments and directed scoring, 
I believe that 1999 discretionary outlays would be about 
$579 billion while 2000 spending would rise to about 
$623 billion, for an increase in the spending base of close 
to 8 percent. This implies the largest real increase since the 
defense increases of the Vietnam era. It is important to note 
that you will never see an 8 percent increase in discretionary 
spending recorded on the books, but I think that it is a 
reasonable estimate, perhaps an underestimate.1 
The key question is, what does all this imply for future years? 
Is it a temporary aberration or are we entering an era of large 
increases in discretionary spending after a long drought? 
Putting the matter another way, are we seeing a permanent 
increase in the size of the civilian government, perhaps 
financed with the cold war peace dividend, or is it a temporary 
surge, of the kind we saw around 1990? 
It depends both on how the budget process evolves and how 
the economy evolves. The spending caps may be satisfied on 
paper this year, but for all practical purposes they are dead. 
Similarly, the pay-as-you-go rule requiring that tax cuts and 
entitlement increases be paid for with other tax increases or 
entitlement cuts for five years in the House and for ten years in 
the Senate was also violated this year.
For practical purposes, these official rules were replaced 
informally with a new constraining rule that says, “thou shalt 
not spend any of the surplus in the Social Security trust fund.” 
If the CBO’s July estimates turn out to be correct, that rule will 
also be violated this year. (The CBO has indicated that its 
January projections will be more optimistic.) And while I 
cannot imagine that real discretionary spending will continue 
to grow at this year’s pace, it is my guess that we are entering a 
new era in which past stringency will be relaxed. If future 
discretionary spending growth is equal to GDP growth, I would 
guess that it will be sufficient to absorb all the on-budget 
surpluses projected under the CBO’s more optimistic January 
2000 assumptions. 
The extreme sensitivity of budget projections to economic 
and technical assumptions makes the rule of balancing the 
non–Social Security budget impractical as a long-run 
constraining guide in the budget process. Changes in economic 
and technical assumptions over a six-month period can easily 
change estimates of that budget balance by $100 billion, when 
it is rare for policy changes to alter the balance by more than 
$50 billion. In other words, the Congress would be attempting 
to control something that is not really under its control in the 
short run. The time is sure to come when the CBO surplus 
forecast deteriorates by $100 billion or so over a relatively short 
period.
Moreover, the rule creates a bias toward on-budget deficits. 
Pleasant surplus surprises will be spent, whereas it will not be 
possible to adjust to adverse surprises. The latter problem 
afflicted the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and was 
responsible for its demise. It was replaced by a much superior 
set of rules in 1990. What will happen when the new rule 
collapses? Will the 1990 rules be resuscitated? It is possible. But 
it is also possible that the new rule will be abandoned and that 
we will go back to trying to balance the unified budget deficit. I 
suspect that the latter is more probable—first, because I doubt 
that the new economic and technical assumptions will improve 
sufficiently to make it politically possible to balance the non–
Social Security budget in the longer run, and second, because it 
will become more and more apparent that it is inane to imply 
that saving the Social Security surplus is directly linked to the 
prospects for paying future benefits. But even if we go back to 
the rule of balancing the unified deficit, there will be surpluses 
for several years while we make that transition.2 But I may be 
too pessimistic about the extent to which the economic 
assumptions will continue to improve. I certainly have been in 
the past. In addition, endogenous changes in the ratio of 
revenues to GDP or in assumed cost growth in Medicare and 
Medicaid can have major effects on the long-run projections, 
but I suspect that those things are more likely to move in a 
pessimistic direction. The budget surplus in 1998 caught us by 
surprise, largely because of a surprising increase in the ratio of 
revenues to GDP and a surprising deceleration in Medicare 
cost growth. The revenue ratio rose from 18.8 percent in 1995 
to 20.5 percent in 1998 and to 20.6 percent in 1999. 
It is probable that a significant portion of the increase is 
related directly or indirectly to the booming stock market. Of 
course, rising capital-gains taxes have played a role, but 
ordinary tax payments by the very rich have risen remarkably, 
and that may also be related to the stock market. The share of 
tax revenues accounted for by taxpayers with an adjusted gross 
income above $200,000 went from 29.5 percent in 1995 to 
37.2 percent in 1997, when such returns accounted for only 
1.5 percent of total returns. The stock market, of course, 
generated huge incomes in the financial sector as well as 
increased the value of taxable withdrawals from retirement 
funds and reduced tax-deductible contributions to defined 
benefit pension plans.
The CBO projects that revenues will grow less rapidly than 
GDP until 2004, with the ratio falling to 20.1 percent. It is 
easily conceivable that a major stock market correction could 
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revenue loss of about $100 billion, even before considering the 
effect of the stock market decline on the economy. But 
surprises on the up side are also possible. One word of warning 
is necessary, however. The next set of CBO projections may 
contain a very large optimistic bias because they will have to 
assume that the ever-more-stringent spending caps of 2001 
and 2002 are satisfied. There is not a chance in the world of 
that happening.
What does all this mean for the amount of public debt that 
will be outstanding over the next ten years? We start with such 
a superb fiscal situation that it is difficult for me to envision 
circumstances in which the debt-to-GDP ratio ten years from 
now would be higher than today’s 41 percent. Everything that 
could go wrong would have to go wrong. The stock market 
would have to fall significantly, the economy would have to go 
into a prolonged recession, and medical costs would have to 
accelerate far beyond recent projections.
On the other side, it is extremely unlikely that the debt-to-
GDP ratio will fall to the 6.4 percent projected for 2009 by the 
CBO in July, even with its more ebullient January economic 
assumptions. That is because of the difficulty of maintaining 
the on-budget surplus implied by current policy, and because 
of my previous assumption that pleasant surplus surprises will 
be used for tax cuts or spending increases while unpleasant 
surprises will only be partially countered by spending 
constraint. Note that the assumption implies a destabilizing 
fiscal policy in the long run, but Keynes said that in the long run 
we are all dead and he certainly is.
Election outcomes may affect the future size of government, 
but I doubt there will be much effect on the size of the deficit 
or the public debt. My remarks thus far imply a debt-to-GDP 
ratio lower than 41 percent and higher than 6 percent at the end 
of the next decade. Maybe I should just leave it at that. But I 
cannot resist noting that if we simply balance the unified deficit 
on average over the next ten years, the debt-to-GDP ratio will 
fall to about 26 percent in 2009, given the CBO’s July GDP 
assumptions. Consequently, I think that the chances are 
considerably more than 50 percent that we shall get below the 
previous post–World War II low of 24 percent achieved at the 
end of fiscal 1974. And remember that a considerable portion 
of that amount—perhaps an amount as high as 6 percent of 
GDP—will be in the hands of the Federal Reserve. In recent 
years, an amount of debt approaching 20 percent of GDP has 
been held by foreigners and state and local governments. 
Private American investors will have to compete vigorously to 
hold any debt at all.
Unfortunately, I am old enough to remember that it was 
around 1974 when we last heard people worrying about a 
shortage of public debt. We sure jinxed the process then. Let us 
hope that we are not jinxing it now.Endnotes
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1. In January and February 2000, the CBO and the OMB released new 
projections that improved the surplus outlook further. The president’s 
budget adjusted for numerous budget mechanisms introduced during 
the appropriations process and it now estimates discretionary 
spending at $617.5 billion in 2000 and $575 billion in 1999, for an 
increase of 7.4 percent. I would move some additional monies from 
1999 to 2000 and stick with my earlier estimate of an 8 percent 
increase. The numbers in the president’s budget are lower than those 
that I used, in part because certain agricultural outlays that were 
earlier defined to be discretionary by the CBO have been reclassified as 
mandatory expenditures. Although both agencies added to their 
projected surpluses, I would not change any of the basic conclusions 
in this paper. As I will note, any increases in projected surpluses are 
likely to be used for future spending increases or tax cuts.
2. Any rule requiring a balanced unified budget is, of course, subject 
to the same criticisms as a rule requiring that on-budget outlays and 
receipts balance. Unified budget totals are as difficult to control, and 
there is no intellectual foundation provided by theoretical economics 
for the proposition that the unified budget should balance every year.  
However, balancing the unified budget has a very long history as an 
indicator of a responsible fiscal policy, and as long as it is an informal 
guide to policy rather than a formal rule enforced by a sequester, it can 
work pretty well.
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